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The capacity of political regimes to formulate and implement
policies in the common interest appears to be a crucial factor of
development. Public institutions in Latin America are often characterized
by a lack of common interest orientation. As a result, most countries of
the region are ill-prepared to meet the challenges of global market
integration and knowledge-based development. Two approaches have
been particularly influential in linking institutions to economic
development: the good governance approach, originally put forward by
the World Bank, and the systemic competitiveness approach introduced
by the German Development Institute. Drawing on insights from both
concepts, this paper presents a framework for the assessment of reform
blockades and propensities in given political systems. This is the
“systemic governance” approach, and it focuses on the capacity to
generate and implement decisions in the common interest at all levels of
the political system. In order to promote second-generation adjustment
reforms, the systemic character of governance has to be grasped.
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From a political scientist’ s point of view, the most
important obstacle to development lies in the fact that
political institutions in developing countries are often
unable to formulate and implement decisions that serve
the common interest.1 Because of this, public goods
such as security and the rule of law, as well as basic
goods and services such as education, health care or
access to water, are not provided in a sufficient quantity
and quality, and they often do not benefit those who
need them most. The lack of security, legal protection
and other public goods translates into high transaction
costs and a low propensity to innovate—typical
features of developing economies. In such an
environment, positive externalities that arise from
economic interaction are not used for the benefit of all,
but rather internalized by a small group of actors, thus
deepening the polarization of wealth and income. Also,
the generation, provision and application of knowledge,
an increasingly important feature of economic
development, is hindered by weak public institutions.
This assessment applies to a majority of Latin
American countries. With few, albeit important
exceptions, the countries of the region seem to be ill-
prepared to face the structural transformation from a
resource-based to a knowledge-based economy.
Speaking in general terms, so far there has been no
“development premium”  arising from democratization
cum market liberalization. On the contrary, the opening
of markets to global competition in the 1980s and
1990s has led to an increased dependency on natural
resources or manufactured goods with low
technological content, low input of qualified labour and
short national value chains.
Although some regional economies have succeeded
in conquering new markets or deepening value chains,
the general picture is one of a persistent, not diminishing,
competitiveness divide between Latin America and the
industrialized world (including a number of East Asian
countries), as illustrated by the region’ s steadily
diminishing role in international trade.2
At the same time, economic growth has done little
to ease income polarization. It appears that the social
and economic costs of market opening in Latin
America have been higher than necessary and the
benefits lower than expected.
Recent political crises in Argentina and Bolivia
underline what has become a leitmotiv of the development
debate in Latin America: there is a pressing need for
additional reform. It would be unreasonable to
maintain, however, that the region had not experienced
profound change, both economically and politically.
Development is taking place, although development
paths differ considerably from those mapped out by
international experts. Facing major obstacles to change,
reform-oriented governments tend to focus on
lighthouse projects, hoping that the introduction of
good governance in a small number of cases may have
positive side-effects on many others. Some of these
“ islands of modernity”  have even become international
benchmarks for innovation.
However, it has proved extremely difficult to
make reforms sustainable in the long term, and to
promote change on a broader scale. Accordingly, the
question is how such sustainability and scale can be
achieved. In answering this, the role that existing
political and administrative institutions play in the
definition and implementation of development
strategies has to be taken into account.
A first draft of this paper was written while the author was
working as a research fellow at the German Development Institute
(GDI) in Bonn, Germany. The views expressed herein are the author’s
and do not necessarily reflect those of any of the institutions he has
worked in. The author would like to thank Tilman Altenburg of the
GDI and Koldo Echebarría of the Inter-American Development Bank
for their helpful comments on an earlier version of the paper.
1 In the words of Kofi Annan, “without the rule of law, predictable
administration, legitimate power and responsive regulation, no
amount of funding, no short-term economic miracle will set the
developing world on the path to prosperity”  (cited in Santiso, 2001,
p. 388).
2 At the outset of structural adjustment, in 1980, the Latin American
share of international merchandise exports was 5.4%, of which 0.9%
was accounted for by Mexico. In 1990, the figure was 4.3% (Mexico,
1.2%). In 2001, the region accounted for 5.5% of global merchandise
exports, of which 2.5% came from Mexico. This means that the
region’s recovery in world markets in the 1990s was entirely due to
Mexico’s strong performance within the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) (see: www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/
statis_e.htm#worldtrade, of 30 September 2003). Only recently has
this trend been reversed, mainly because of rising global commodity
prices.
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This paper proposes a conceptual framework for
assessing the institutional reform path available to
political authorities in less than perfect settings. It does
so by taking a closer look at two well-known approaches
which have tried to tackle the complex relationship
between institutions and development: good governance
and systemic competitiveness. Analysing the actual
performance of existing institutions at the meta, macro,
meso, and micro levels makes it possible to describe the
threats and opportunities they present for structural
change. By looking at the systemic governance of
political regimes, this paper seeks to contribute to a more
realistic approach to State modernization and
development cooperation. Both policy makers and
international donors have to realize that exclusion,
marginalization and poverty, rather than the failings of
specific development patterns, are systemic features in
many developing countries. Consequently, this paper
calls for a revision of the Washington consensus in the
light of the findings presented below.
3 See World Bank (1992). Recently, Thandika Mkandawire, Direc-
tor of the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development
(UNRISD), has called attention to the fact that the term “ good
governance”  as originally devised by African scholars had a much
broader meaning than later suggested by the World Bank. See
Mkandawire (2004, p. 380).
II
Institutions and development: good
governance and systemic competitiveness
1. Good governance
The World Bank introduced the notion of good
governance in the late 1980s in order to describe the
requirements, mostly at the national level, of
transparent and efficient public regulation and service
delivery for market-oriented growth.3 The concept
served as a guide to State reforms and development
cooperation in the structural adjustment process, and
has been a crucial reference point for institutional
reform ever since. Although other international actors
have different project portfolios and diverging views
on some key aspects of State-society relations, it can
be argued that the World Bank concept of good
governance constitutes a “bottom line”  vision shared
by most international organizations. This vision
embraces democratic and legitimate political
institutions, an efficient and accountable public
administration, the rule of law, human rights guarantees
and effective public regulation of markets.
In promoting good governance, the World Bank
has limited itself to issues covered by its mandate, thus
leaving out, for instance, reforms to core political
institutions such as parliaments or electoral regimes.
Today, World Bank activities focus mainly on judicial
and administrative reform, the regulation and
promotion of market competition, decentralization,
anti-corruption measures, and fiscal reform. However,
the Bank has made it increasingly clear that without
common interest orientation of core political
institutions and actors good governance cannot be
achieved. This is one of the main messages of the 2004
World Development Report (World Bank, 2003).
Since the mid-1990s the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP) has taken a somewhat
different approach to good governance, stressing the
importance of participatory political processes and
articulate civil society organizations, and emphasizing
the role of the State in the promotion of human rather
than merely economic development (UNDP, 1995; UNDP,
1997, pp. 10-41). UNDP has identified four different
dimensions of governance:
— Economic governance: a competitive and non-
discriminatory market order conducive to
economic growth.
— Political governance: participatory, democratic,
legitimate, pluralist and accessible political
institutions.
— Administrative governance: an efficient,
transparent, independent and accountable public
administration.
— Systemic governance: societal institutions that
protect cultural and religious values, help to
provide for freedom and security, and promote
equal opportunities for the exercise of personal
capabilities.
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While the first three dimensions constitute “ the
formal institutional and organizational structure of
authoritative decision-making in the modern state”
(UNDP, 1997, p. 10), the fourth dimension highlights the
embeddedness of the State in a wider context of social
order. As can be seen, we borrow the term “systemic
governance”  from UNDP, although we use it as a truly
comprehensive concept and not as a residual category
for institutions which do not fall into one of the other
categories.
However, putting the approach into practice has
been difficult. International donors and civil society
organizations in Third World countries have had
trouble in promoting good governance in the face of
governments which, while usually agreeing that
particular institutions needed modernizing, have been
less enthusiastic about calling into question the
traditional, elitist functioning of the political process
itself. The prevailing implementation pattern has thus
relied on one-off reforms, all too often with only
limited impact on the general governance of the partner
State. This has led some authors to announce, maybe
a little prematurely, the “ demise”  of the good
governance concept.4 Critics claim that the approach:
i) overemphasizes government downsizing and
austerity while failing to address crucial issues of
underregulation and public-sector weakness;
ii) focuses almost exclusively on the failings of
institutions with respect to good governance,
neglecting the functions public institutions (even
“bad”  institutions) effectively fulfil;
iii) concentrates on the internal functioning of
individual public institutions, ignoring others and
disregarding the embeddedness of institutions;
iv) therefore, does not account for the propensity and
capacity of existing political systems to adapt to
changing framework conditions on the basis of a
common interest perspective;
v) accordingly, lacks a deeper understanding as to
which societal actors may influence the promotion
(or blocking) of governance reform, and does not
have a vision of the strategic management of
development;
vi) lastly, inflates expectations by emphasizing the
gains from reforms and suggesting linear progress,
while omitting the costs of adjustment and the
inherent risks of institutional change.
Criticisms have been directed above all against the
World Bank, which has reacted partly by broadening
its focus and assuming a more political position, partly
by sharpening its profile and bringing in other
organizations as complementary actors.5 Through its
Comprehensive Development Frameworks (CDF) and
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) in particular,
the Bank has sought to put reforms in a broader context
of pro-poor economic growth and improved
governance. Whether these instruments will effectively
bring about a change of view concerning key
governance issues remains to be seen.6
2. Systemic competitiveness
Systemic competitiveness is a concept introduced by
the German Development Institute in the 1990s with
a view to achieving a better understanding of the
challenges of economic development, competition and
enterprise organization arising from globalization.7
Drawing on insights from ECLAC and the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), it
synthesizes debates on clusters and industrial districts,
innovation economics, networks, neostructuralist
approaches to the State, New Institutional Economics,
etc.8 The fundamental question, as brought out by the
concept, is not whether the State or the market should
be strengthened, but rather how both types of
institutions can interact in order to combine strengths
and overcome specific weaknesses.
The concept of systemic competitiveness
distinguishes four levels of interaction:
i) the meta-level encompasses development-oriented
values, a social consensus on the necessity and
conditions of market-oriented development, and
the capacity of a political order to formulate
visions and guidelines for development;
ii) the macro-level refers to a stable macroeconomic
and macropolitical framework and general patterns
of regulation that enable factor, commodity and
capital markets to work properly (sound fiscal
4 See Doornbos (2001). For the following criticisms, see also Moore
(1993), Weiss (2000) and Mkandawire (2004).
5 See World Bank (2000, pp. 55-58 and 2001, p. 96).
6 Recent PRSP evaluations by both the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) show that so far expectations
have not been met. See: www.imf.org/External/NP/ieo/2004/
prspprgf/eng/index.htm and www.worldbank.org/oed/prsp/
index.html, of 20 October 2004.
7 This chapter draws mainly on Esser and others (1996) and
Altenburg, Hillebrand and Meyer-Stamer (1998). See also Altenburg
and Meyer-Stamer (1999).
8 See Fajnzylber (1988) on “ international competitiveness”  and OECD
(1992) on “structural competitiveness” .
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policies, a market-friendly exchange-rate policy,
open investment regimes);
iii) the meso-level consists of task- or sector-specific
institutions which provide specific public goods
and services necessary for economic activity and
promote development on sectoral or territorial
terms;
iv) the micro-level focuses on intra-firm management
to promote efficiency gains and innovation, and
inter-firm networking that allows for the creation
of positive externalities and spillovers between
enterprises.
By integrating these four levels of interaction, the
approach points to a new balance of power between
State and market, whereby the former has to acquire
new regulatory competencies in some fields and
deregulate other areas, in order for the latter to work
properly. The basic idea behind the concept is that it
is not the individual firm that carries broad-based
development and sustainable growth, but rather
networks of enterprises and their interactions with other
social actors in the context of integrated production
systems. For these networks to build up and these
interactions to occur, transaction costs are a crucial
factor. They are especially high if markets are volatile,
institutions weak and the macroeconomic setting
unstable. The systemic competitiveness concept
presents a number of ideas on how to lower transaction
costs at different levels of State intervention.9
Unfortunately, the concept has less to say about
the State’ s capacity to bring about the proposed
changes, i.e., its ability to define and implement
policies that serve the common interest. With regard
to this, Altenburg and Meyer-Stamer recommend the
strengthening of heterarchical, network-shaped forms
of decision-making that integrate public and private
actors: “ We take it for granted that autocratic,
hierarchical modes of governance are becoming
obsolete. New forms of governance are emerging that
are based on a new kind of interaction between State
and social actors, typically in horizontal networks.” 10
This assessment does not relate well to today’s
reality in the Latin America region, nor does it take
account of the prerequisites of effective public policy
in general: the State’ s capacity for authoritative
decision-making and policy implementation is a key
—and often absent— feature of governance for
development. To be sure, networks and public-private
cooperation are becoming increasingly important in the
formulation and implementation of policies, since they
allow for the inclusion of relevant actors at an early
stage of decision-making, thus improving the quality
of decisions and facilitating the implementation of
policies. But if these “new forms of governance”  are
not embedded in a clear definition of the respective
roles of public and private actors, along with a certain
degree of State autonomy vis-à-vis powerful societal
interests, they are very likely to impose additional
stress on the governance of a political regime in terms
of legitimacy, effectiveness and efficiency.11
To sum up the argument, the concept of systemic
competitiveness encompasses the functions States
should assume in order to promote broad-based
development. Also, in connecting to a number of
related debates and approaches, it provides valuable
insights into the logic and sequencing of institutional
reform at different levels of the political system. On
the other hand, its promoters do not examine how
hierarchical forms of public decision-making operate
in developing countries, and how they relate to
network-like patterns of political interaction. As a
result, the concept is quite demanding where State
capabilities are concerned. Although a group of
advanced developing countries may be able to meet the
exigencies of systemic competitiveness, those situated
towards the lower end of the scale will most certainly
have a hard time doing so.
For this second group, which includes a majority
of Latin American countries, the question is whether
(and how) institutions with limited regulatory capacity
and little autonomy vis-à-vis powerful societal interests
can produce policies that serve the common interest.
So far, this issue has hardly been touched upon by the
international debate on development, although many
agencies have acknowledged the need for further
strengthening of the institutional structure.12 Rather, a
common approach is to assume implicitly that the State
which is supposed to improve its governance by means
of institutional change already has the capability to
carry through these reforms in a sustainable way.
9 Altenburg and Meyer-Stamer (1999, pp. 7-16).
10 Altenburg and Meyer-Stamer (1999, p. 3). To be fair, one should
mention that Meyer-Stamer (2001, p. 27) recognizes the need for
heterarchical patterns of organization to be controlled by hierarchical
forms of governance.
11 Referring to this problem, Evans (1992, p. 139) calls for the
State to have “embedded autonomy” .
12 One of the most interesting approaches to this topic is that of
ECLAC (2000). As a matter of fact, civic rights cannot be exercised
effectively without a minimum common interest orientation on the
part of the State.
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An alternative approach would be to explore the
conditions under which States with a low level of
autonomy and capacity do act in the common interest.
As Olson (2000) has shown, common interest
orientation is possible even in such a setting: political
leaders do not have to be altruistic in order to pursue
common interest policies, even without a sophisticated
system of checks and balances.13 However, their
rational self-interest is broader than Olson suggests in
that it includes the interest of legitimizing and thus
preserving a given order, along with that of serving
their own interests through redistribution. Any
government aiming to survive tries to legitimize its rule
by invoking some kind of common interest. Normally,
this implies a degree of public goods provision.
As a consequence, political regimes do not need
to be perfectly representative in order to limit
redistribution and provide public goods. Conversely,
even under representative rule political leaders will
have an interest in advancing their own privileges. This
means that the problem of common interest policies
cannot be resolved merely by the establishment of a
democratic order, as suggested by some contributions
to the good governance approach: even though the vast
majority of Latin American countries are governed by
democratically elected authorities, it would be naïve to
assume that leaders always pursued policies in the
common interest. Rather, the pursuit of their own
privileges (or redistribution, in Olson’ s terms) and
public goods provision (or common interest policies)
are two divergent options which have to be
continuously rebalanced, taking into account the
available resources and the institutional setting. In the
following chapter we will see how these divergent
interests translate into governance patterns at different
levels of interaction.
13 See Olson (2000, pp. 1-109). In Olson’s terms, the common
interest is an interest which aims at a Pareto-efficient distribution
of welfare gains.
14 See, for instance, Haggard (1995); Edwards (1995); Haggard and
Kaufman (1995, pp. 151-379).




At the outset of the new millennium, most Latin
American economies have switched from State-led to
market-led development, but the concomitant
adjustment of political and societal institutions has been
slow, uneven and conflictive. The reform programme
sketched out in the Washington consensus focused on
macroeconomic opening and called for the
liberalization of foreign commerce, the deregulation of
markets and investment regimes, and the privatization
of public-sector enterprises. Although reference was
also made to modernizing public administration,
strengthening the State’ s regulatory capacities,
improving the rule of law and consolidating democratic
regimes, these aspects only received due attention later
in the 1990s, when it became increasingly clear that
structural adjustment was coming up against problems
rooted in the system of governance itself.14
Today, Latin America faces a twofold challenge:
governments have to see through “ second-stage”
adjustment reforms while at the same time laying the
groundwork for knowledge-based development in the
wake of economic opening and globalization.15 It is a
key question for the next decade or so of Latin
American development whether the second- (or third-)
generation reforms required today will be implemented
swiftly and thoroughly. Will the eventual shift from
resource-based to knowledge-based development be
more inclusive and at the same time less disruptive and
less conflictive than the shift from State-led to market-
led development has been? This question can be
answered if we know what the basic lock-ins of the
current institutional setting look like.
In this section we maintain that political systems
in Latin America are characterized by a mix of “modern”
and “ traditional”  institutions. We present an approach
that helps us to better understand the resources these
peculiar political orders generate for their respective
societies. We call this approach “systemic governance”
and define it as the capacity to generate and implement
decisions in the common interest at all levels of the
political system. In the following sections we take a
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closer look at the meta-, macro-, meso- and micro-
levels of governance.
1. The meta-level
If development is a process that involves goal-oriented
behaviour, then a society’ s development potential
depends to a considerable degree on its capacity to set
itself goals and pursue them. This applies to nations
as well as to local communities. Social identities and
goals are important prerequisites for mobilizing and
focusing public and private resources in order to
overcome development blockades. This is especially
important at times of structural change and adjustment,
when societies are obliged to leave traditional
development paths and create new structures and
routines. Strategic planning and goal setting can be
described in terms of the political meta-projects
societies propose for themselves. In this context,
Stepan’s distinction between offensive and defensive
projects is useful.16
— Offensive projects have a foundational character.
They aim at overcoming lock-ins resulting from
path dependency. For example, European Union
membership has been a broadly accepted
offensive project for Eastern European candidate
countries, allowing for sweeping changes in the
regulation of economic and social affairs.
— Defensive projects, in turn, are formulated in
reaction to a perceived threat to society. They aim
at preserving (or reconsolidating) a given order.
In Latin America, incoming authoritarian regimes
formulated defensive projects against communist
subversion in the 1970s and 1980s, mostly with
quite negative consequences for economic and
social development.
The basic function of political meta-projects is to
legitimize public policies. If they attract public support
they endow the State with autonomy vis-à-vis societal
actors and with additional capacity to generate
revenues (taxes, fees). In contrast, a government that
is unable to formulate and “sell”  a project will face
difficulties in mustering the necessary political and
material support to carry through structural reforms. At
present, Germany seems to be a good example of this
kind of problem.
It should be kept in mind, however, that political
meta-projects are not a stable, long-term source of
legitimacy. Usually, they have a short or medium time
horizon, which means that sooner or later those
targeted by the project will ask for tangible results. If
a project is successful, State interventions may be
transferred into more institutionalized patterns,
eventually forming a new regime with a proper basis
of legitimacy. If a project fails, though, the regime will
most certainly have to cope with legitimacy problems.
In Latin America, the main offensive project that
came with State-led development from the 1950s to the
1970s was populism.17 Its argument was that taking
control of the State from the vested interests of landed
and financial capital was the key to a more equitable
and “modern”  distribution of resources, largely in
favour of urban workers and the emerging middle class.
The underlying motive of this project was rent seeking
through the control of an active and interventionist
State. Populism fitted well into pre-existing patterns of
political integration and decision-making in Latin
America. For instance, as benefits were distributed by
the incumbents of political or administrative posts, the
traditional personalist focus of Latin American politics
was reinforced. However, as an approach to welfare
policy it has been rather inefficient. Even before the
rapid increase of poverty during the “ lost decade”  of
the 1980s, Latin America had the least equitable
distribution of wealth and income of any region in the
world. Things have become worse, not better, since
then.
Today, the unfulfilled promise of broad-based
development through public intervention and
distribution has been replaced by the equally unfulfilled
promise of development through market activity.
Triggered by the debt crisis of the 1980s, Latin
America has experienced a truly dramatic shift in the
way development and State-society relations are
perceived. In countries with authoritarian regimes, the
change to democracy constituted an important
foundational project. In contrast to a number of East
Asian and Central European countries, though, the
market-led pattern of development has not been
introduced successfully as an offensive project in Latin
America. It is revealing that even the most prominent
16 See Stepan (1985, pp. 320-340).
17 Populism is defined for our purposes as a set of policies geared
towards the integration of hitherto marginalized sectors of the
population and based on an i) anti-class, ii) anti-status quo and iii)
personalist-charismatic leadership approach (see Laclau, 1986,
pp. 165-233, for an in-depth discussion of populism). To be sure, it
is not suggested here that three decades of Latin American economic
and political development can be summarized under the notion of
populism.
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“neoliberal”  leaders in the region, Argentina’s Carlos
Menem and Peru’s Alberto Fujimori, had previously
been elected on the basis of a markedly “ anti-
neoliberal”  discourse.18 There are two basic reasons
why political leaders in Latin America have pursued
market opening in practice without using it as an
offensive meta-project:
— In countries like Argentina, Chile, and Brazil
market-oriented reforms had already been initiated
under authoritarian rule, with extremely high
social and political costs. Accordingly, market
liberalization was linked to authoritarianism and
thus politically discredited.
— The results of structural adjustment with respect
to growth, income distribution and social
development have been poor.19 In the eyes of
much of the Latin American public, market-led
development is not a project in the common
interest, but rather a straitjacket imposed by
external forces.
At the same time, after an initial legitimacy boost
derived from regime change, many Latin American
democracies have had serious difficulties in improving
their governance. Corruption, self-serving policies, lack
of legal guarantees and of access to political decision-
making, and bad administration have been obstinate
features of political regimes, leading to widespread
disillusionment with the democracy-cum-market model.
As a reaction, in some countries (e.g., Venezuela,
Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia) neopopulist positions have
gained acceptance, with leaders promising to act upon
both equity and governance deficits from outside the
“political class” , and claiming a renewed role for the
State in the development process.
In some countries, recent elections have brought
to power leaders who have denounced the equity and
governance deficit of structural adjustment without
denying the necessity of market integration and
economic opening. In conceptual terms, the emphasis
on social, economic and cultural rights seems to be a
key element of the new political discourse. Modern
political constitutions, such as those of Colombia and
Brazil, could very well serve as normative platforms
for a rights approach to development. In practical
terms, however, the elitist, personalist political style
prevalent in Latin America has not yet been called into
question. Even under conditions of party-based
political competition, as for instance in parts of Brazil,
the focus is on persons and electoral cycles rather than
on political meta-projects. Most Brazilian citizens
expect Lula to change things for the better, not the
Partido dos Trabalhadores that is in government.
Summing up the argument, it remains to be seen
if a new meta-project is emerging in Latin America.
Given the current record of lagging growth, growing
polarization of wealth and income, a structural
undersupply of public goods and services and, above all,
a considerable deficit of institution-based legitimacy and
confidence, rallying heterogeneous societies behind an
overarching development project within the disciplines
of market orientation and democracy is a truly
challenging task. Without a feasible vision of
development, though, Latin American political leaders
will have a hard time mustering the resources needed
for a radical change of rules. This calls for a piecemeal,
incremental, negotiated and broadly communicated
approach to structural reform, and not for sweeping
changes decided upon by small elite groups.
2. The macro-level
Macropolitical institutions create the overall setting for
the production of public goods and services. They
stabilize expectations and contribute to economic
development by lowering transaction costs. Basic rules
for the functioning of markets and political decision-
making are set at this level. Many Latin American
regimes, however, appear to be unable to provide an
effective macropolitical framework. State-led
development resulted in a specific set of institutions, and
this has not been dismantled completely in the process
of market opening. As a result, governments face
difficulties in formulating and implementing common
interest policies. Strengthening political representation
and competition through formal democratic channels
seems to be a key to the effective promotion of common
interest policies and further institutional reform.
How come democratization has not brought
macropolitical stability and effectiveness? One
explanation lies in the fact that political systems are
characterized by “hybrid regimes” .20  The term refers
18 In fact, the only neoliberal politician to be elected on an openly
liberal ticket was Brazil’s Collor de Mello, who was able to take
advantage of a highly polarized political landscape.
19 See Ocampo (2003) for the relevant ECLAC data.
20 The concept of hybrid regimes was introduced by Karl (1995).
Other authors have come to speak, for instance, of “delegative
democracies” , “ exclusionary democracies”  or “ defective
democracies” . See O’Donnell (1996) and Merkel (1999) for a
discussion of democratic subtypes.
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to the coexistence of democratic institutions endowed
with formally well-defined systems of checks and
balances alongside a set of (often informal) institutions,
such as clientelism and corruption, which largely
determine the social distribution of resources. These
informal institutions have flourished at times of State-
led development, although they were mostly
established a long time ago in the context of colonial
feudalism. As a result, rent seeking constitutes a “ layer
of continuity”  in the often rapidly changing institutional
settings of Latin American political systems.
The debt crisis and the opening of markets have
diminished opportunities for rent seeking in most
countries of the region, although substantial transfers
may have taken place during the transformation period,
for instance in the context of privatizations. At the
same time, the structures and agents of the old model
have only reluctantly adjusted to the new distributional
conditions of market-led development. Even today
electoral posts tend to be regarded as vehicles for the
pursuit of particular interests. Parliaments are often
controlled by forces favourable to the status quo, which
try to block or water down reforms. In quite a few
countries (e.g., Argentina, Brazil, Colombia), backward
regions, which are often strongholds of clientelism, are
overrepresented in Congress.
Presidentialism, the prevalent political order in
Latin America, has contributed to the consolidation of
hybrid regimes:21 the contest for legitimacy between
the executive and the legislative branches of
government has generally resulted in a failure to
achieve stable parliamentary majorities. The usual
“game”  has thus been for parliaments to pass laws
piecemeal in exchange for negotiated material benefits
each time. In a number of cases, those benefits have
been distributed outside of formal budget procedures.
Also, it is a well-known fact that Latin American
parliaments lack the infrastructure and means to
discharge their legislative and oversight functions
effectively. Parliamentary deadlocks have triggered
recurrent initiatives to side-step parliament, either
through outright authoritarianism or by granting
exceptional powers to the president.
Political competition focusing on access to rents
instead of the provision of public goods has given rise
to political parties with weak ideological ties, typically
formed around charismatic leaders. In many countries,
furthermore, electoral regimes have been tailored to
political personalism. For example, the Colombian
electoral regime gives political parties a strong
incentive to multiply the number of electoral lists (the
so-called “ operación avispa” ), in order to gain
additional seats in Congress. This means that local or
regional political bosses (caciques) rarely negotiate
common political positions, but instead start lists of
their own. Unsurprisingly, efforts to change this regime
under the successive presidencies of Samper, Pastrana
and Uribe have failed to prosper due to lack of political
support in Congress.
At the same time, new actors have emerged as
rent seekers in the face of weak State regulation. Given
the dependency on capital inflows of most Latin
American countries, transnational corporations or local
economic groups are in a strong position to negotiate
their participation in privatizations and large
investment projects. Using this leverage, companies
have been able to reduce their risk and raise their
benefits considerably. Generally speaking, Latin
American governments still have a long way to go in
creating a truly transparent and fair business
environment.
Informal institutions are not unique to the Latin
America region. They exist in every political system,
including those of the industrialized countries. Informal
institutions serve as the “grease”  of political systems
and public administration: they improve the
informational basis for policy-making and
implementation and provide the shortcuts needed to
speed up the political process. They facilitate
adaptation to changing environments, preventing
excessively violent ruptures in political and societal
regimes.
Under conditions of good governance, there is a
clear hierarchy between formal and informal
institutions: the latter complement the former. In cases
of open conflict, formal institutions prevail, or else the
formalization of informal institutions takes place.
In hybrid regimes, however, informal institutions
do not complement, but at times rather contradict
formal institutions: instead of helping to smooth
institutional change they serve to postpone reforms, to
impose additional adjustment costs on society in
general and to prevent innovation in both the public
and private sectors. This is so mainly for two reasons.
First, hybrid regimes operate on a two-tier basis
of representation and distribution that limits their
capacity to formulate and implement common interest
21 Presidentialism endows the executive with a legitimacy of its
own, independent of parliamentary majorities. On this issue, see
Mainwaring and Shugart (1998); Nohlen and Fernández (1998);
Krumwiede and Nolte (2000).
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policies. On the one hand, political leaders represent
and are accountable to citizens who have voted for
them; as incumbents of political or administrative
authority they have an agenda of public goods
provision. On the other hand, political leaders represent
and are accountable to clients who support them with
needed resources (capital to finance political
campaigns, votes, access to elites or specific groups).
At this level, holders of public posts have an agenda
of rent seeking and distribution. If they fail to deliver,
they lose political support and may eventually end up
in jail or exile. Obviously, the common interest is not
an important factor here, although some degree of
redistribution to the poorer sectors of society takes
place.
Second, the basic legitimation patterns of hybrid
regimes work against market-oriented change. Since
political support hinges upon clientelist relationships,
the provision of jobs in public institutions is crucial and
political leaders will be less interested in raising
administrative efficiency by cutting employment. Also,
investments will tend to have a time horizon that
reflects the political cycle, and they will be geared
towards specific groups rather than the provision of
public goods to the general public. Finally, elitist and
non-transparent patterns of decision-making are crucial
features of hybrid regimes. Accordingly, there will be
resistance to opening up the political process to citizen
participation and public debate.
In the context of market-oriented reform, hybrid
regimes have been most successful when they have
been able to bring in shock reforms to implement
measures that have proved to be inevitable, such as the
liberalization of capital markets or currency regimes.
Seeing through gradual, more comprehensive reform
has turned out to be much more difficult. It appears that
the elitist, authoritarian and status quo-oriented part of
hybrid regimes may allow for changes if certain
prerequisites are met: i) there is a hegemonic reform
path with no “ soft”  exit option (e.g., access to
additional funds) on hand; ii) changes are radical
instead of incremental, meaning that they cannot be
reversed easily (e.g., the opening up of financial
markets or privatization), and iii) statu-quo groups can
be compensated or repressed.
These prerequisites apply to first-generation
reforms much more than to the current agenda of
institutional modernization and capacity-building:
i) The core reform path of the Washington consensus,
consisting of liberalization, deregulation,
privatization and fiscal adjustment, was “ the only
game in town”  at the time. There were no other
adjustment strategies to hand that could claim to
be equally all-encompassing and theoretically
well-grounded. Today, different options exist with
respect to institutional fine-tuning, decentralization
and the degree of sectoral regulation and
intervention.
ii) Also, important measures could be implemented
through shock policies, changing the rules of the
game from one moment to the next without giving
vested interests the time to mobilize. By contrast,
there is no way of using shock methods to build
up regulatory capacities, improve the quality of
public goods and services or raise the efficiency
of public administration.
iii) Lastly, in some Latin American countries
additional capital inflows derived from capital
market liberalization and the privatization of
public enterprises were used to alleviate the
burden of adjustment for those groups aligned
with the traditional model of State-led growth. To
the extent that alternative sources of capital dry
up, however, pressure for structural reform
increases while at the same time the capacity for
compensatory measures diminishes.
In general terms, the present situation of a
majority of Latin American countries can be described
as one of increasing pressure for structural reforms,
combined with a decreasing capacity to side-step them.
At the same time, democratization and decentralization
have contributed to the gradual opening up of political
regimes, leading to the emergence of new political
forces and the disintegration or rearrangement of
traditional organizations. This combination of fiscal
pressure and political opening calls for changes in the
way political regimes are legitimized. Political
authorities all over the region are beginning to realize
that political competition has to be organized
differently under conditions of market-led growth than
under conditions of State-led growth. Compared to
access to rents, the provision of public goods by an
efficient administration is gaining importance as a
source of legitimacy.
3. The meso-level
Common interest policies such as the production of
public goods and the promotion of development do not
only depend on macropolitical institutions. In most
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cases, sectoral institutions at the meso-level are
required, too, in order to target policies properly.
Recent development thinking grants the State a much
more active, and interactive, role in the development
process than was originally envisaged by the promoters
of the Washington consensus. It is widely agreed today
that first-generation reforms aimed at market-led
development in Latin America concentrated
excessively on macroeconomic adjustment, leading
policy makers all over the region to underestimate the
importance of meso-level reform.
Latin American governments have become
increasingly concerned with filling the institutional gap
inherited from the past.22 Institution-building can be
observed in a large number of policy fields, each of
which presents specific challenges and dynamics. This
paper limits itself to discussing two cross-cutting issues
that appear to be of particular importance. First,
widespread progress with decentralization highlights
the need for policy coordination between different
levels of government (vertical coordination). Second,
promotion of knowledge-based development calls for
linkages between sectoral policies and cooperation
between public and private actors (horizontal
coordination).
State-led development resulted in a specific set of
meso-level institutions. Although there is a
considerable variety of institutional landscapes in the
region, they appear to share some common features:
— State-led development enhanced the centralist
logic of public policy already prevalent in many
countries of the region, since it presumed that
only the national State was able to orchestrate the
necessary efforts in the fields of infrastructure,
social policy, education and industrial
promotion.
— Development was perceived as planned action.
Countries in the region built up large planning
agencies. More often than not, though, the
implementation process suffered from a lack of
monitoring and evaluation, from weak links to
budgeting, and from overly rigid planning
procedures, which did not take sufficient
account of the interests and capacities of social
actors.
— Direct public-sector engagement in production
was regarded as a means of overcoming market
failure. Sectors such as energy, mining, steel,
finance, machinery and shipyards were regarded
as crucial. In countries such as Argentina, political
ruptures and military intervention led to the
formation of large military-industrial corporations.
— Economic development promotion consisted in a
two-tier approach. One set of instruments were
geared towards big and modern enterprises,
normally managed by the economic affairs
ministry and its field agencies or by national
development banks. Another set of promotion
tools were geared towards small enterprises and
were often managed with a social instead of a
productive focus. Taken as a whole, development
promotion had a strong bias against small and
medium enterprises (SMEs).
— With respect to research and development (R&D),
the constraints of import substitution encouraged
public funding in some strategic sectors of
industry. Consequently, there was a certain degree
of technological capacity-building, although the
productivity gap with world markets continued to
widen, due to the rent seeking that resulted from
protectionism.
— Policy formulation and implementation suffered
from sectoral segmentation, despite the rhetoric of
integrated planning. The political logic of hybrid
regimes gave those operating them strong incentives
to avoid cooperation, in order to maintain (or
expand, if possible) their own individual spheres
of influence. As a result, even in cases where
public institutions shared the same macropolitical
orientations, there was little institutional fine-
tuning and integration of sectoral policies.
This specific pattern of centralized meso-level
regulation ceased to serve economic development with
the opening up of markets, but it continued to fulfil
functions of political reproduction. At the same time,
governments at the national and, increasingly, the
subnational level have had to assume new roles as
regulators, promoters and coordinators of market-led
development. Two important reference points for
meso-level institution-building today are the
decentralization of competencies and resources and the
promotion of knowledge-based development.
a) Decentralization
With few exceptions, Latin American countries
have made major progress with the decentralization of
22 See, for instance, case studies on Argentina, Chile, Venezuela,
Mexico and Colombia in Naím and Tulchin (1999), especially the
overview given by Naím on pages 15 to 32.
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competencies and resources. In fact, decentralization
has been a key policy for reconciling the exigencies
of market liberalization with those of State
modernization in hybrid regimes. However, there is
still a remarkable lack of policy coordination between
government levels.
Market liberalization has had major
repercussions for the competitiveness of enterprises
and locations. Both firms and locations are much
more exposed to competition today than they were
before. To the degree that the central State has ceased
to intervene, produce, subsidize and regulate, it has
opened up space for public action at the subnational
level. Consequently, international institutions
emphasize decentralized institution-building, e.g.,
with respect to service provision and economic
development promotion.23
State modernization has endowed local and
intermediate-level governments with new functions. In
the last two decades, governments have increasingly
transferred competencies and resources to
municipalities and intermediate (department, province,
state) levels, above all in areas such as education,
health, local infrastructure and public services. Lower
levels of government have become more important as
partners for the private sector.
However, municipal and regional authorities have
sometimes been hesitant to assume the challenges of
development promotion. This is because there are still
significant disincentives to a more active policy at the
local and regional level. To begin with, lower levels
of government often depend to a large degree on fiscal
transfers from the State, in spite of fiscal
decentralization efforts.24 Also, central government
agencies tend to maintain their sectoral grip on
enterprise promotion and infrastructure provision, with
negative consequences for the territorial integration of
policies. Without the competencies and capacities to
fulfil the tasks imposed on them, local and regional
governments find it difficult to assume an active role
in the vertical coordination of policies.
Obviously, decentralization does not always
stimulate common interest orientation. Institutional
patterns of State-led development, such as clientelism
and corruption, may be reproduced at the local and
intermediate level. However, certain aspects of
decentralization, especially the growing intensity of
political competition and the greater proximity of
political authorities and public administration to their
clientele, operate in favour of institutional modernization.
Also, a spatial perspective on development facilitates
the provision of relevant information to enterprises, the
coordination of sectoral policies, the promotion of
enterprise cooperation and the deepening of existing
value chains locally.25
b) Knowledge-based development
Market opening, often in combination with severe
fiscal crises, has deeply affected existing innovation
systems. On the one hand, the opening up of these
systems to global competition has revealed a profound
lack of competitiveness and productivity. On the other
hand, public investment in these areas has suffered
deep cutbacks, making it even more difficult for the
respective institutions to cope with the new
competition. This latter trend was reversed in the
1990s, with governments spending larger shares of
their budgets on education.26 Although this does not
say much about the quality of education with respect
to the requirements of knowledge-based development,
it indicates that governments acknowledge the
importance of investing in this area. At the same time,
other than in Brazil and Mexico, no upward trend was
observed in research and development (R&D) spending
in the 1990s.27
Under conditions of global market competition,
however, even a knowledge-extensive development
path calls for additional efforts to generate, provide and
incorporate knowledge, in order to be sustainable.
Broadening the growth base through rural development,
23 The World Development Report 1997 and World Development
Report 2002 (World Bank, 1997 and 2001) were particularly
outspoken with respect to decentralization. The Inter-American
Development Bank (IDB, 2001) and ECLAC (see Aghón, Alburquerque
and Cortés, 2001) have also stressed the issue of decentralization.
24 Excessive fiscal centralization, a typical feature of the State-led
development pattern, lends itself to moral hazard: confronted with
budget constraints, it may be more beneficial for a local government
to renegotiate its participation in central government transfers than
to step up its own revenue-raising or implement austerity measures.
25 See Campbell and Fuhr (2004, pp. 11-52) for a discussion of
decentralization in a context of innovation, State reform and market-
led development.
26 Average education spending in the region rose from 2.9% of GDP
in 1990-1991 to 4.2% in 2000-2001. See ECLAC (2003, p. 27).
27 The enormous R&D spending gap between Latin America and
the industrialized countries becomes evident when we compare
spending per capita. In 2000 Mexico spent US$ 23.46 per capita on
R&D, Chile US$ 26.88 and Brazil US$ 37.71. Spain, on the other
hand, spent US$ 188.42, Canada US$ 514.76 and the United States
US$ 937.96. See http://www.ricyt.org/indicadores/comparativos/
06.xls, 17 October 2003.
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integrating SMEs into formal markets and global value
chains, strengthening agro-industrial know-how
(including specific exporting know-how) and
promoting the sustainable use of natural resources are
just a few of the challenges governments have to deal
with today.28
Innovation leading to the development of new
products and the extension of local value chains is
usually taking place as a systemic interaction of
different knowledge fields and actors along the value
chain, including providers and customers. In order to
reap innovation rents, time-to-market is a crucial factor.
Therefore, spatial proximity (allowing for localization
economies), a modern communications infrastructure
and low transaction costs in general are all crucial
elements of innovation systems. These features favour
locations that already possess comparative advantages
in knowledge-intensive activities.
Yet gradual upgrading of locations is possible. In
a number of meso-level areas Latin American
governments have already initiated reforms, but work
remains to be done. To give some examples, ties
between universities, research centres, etc., and the
private sector have to be strengthened in order to focus
knowledge generation on the needs of enterprises and
to stimulate technology transfer. Public monitoring and
control of education and R&D has to be improved, so
as to enhance the quantity and quality of the knowledge
supply. Also, Latin America is lagging behind when
it comes to funding for precompetitive research and tax
incentives for R&D at the enterprise level. Many
countries in the region still have to improve property
right protection as a basic condition for the generation
of innovation rents. Lastly, since knowledge
incorporation is not the isolated work of individual
firms, the promotion of inter-firm linkages (provider
networks, producer associations, etc.) should receive
more attention.
4. The micro-level
In the context of systemic governance, the micro-level
refers to the organizational structure and the
management of public administration and political
institutions. If citizens or businesses throughout the
region were asked to describe the public sector they
have to deal with, the following features would
certainly come up again and again:
— public administrations regard citizens and
enterprises not as customers but as petitioners;
— procedures are complicated and slow;
— the provision of fundamental public goods such
as security and legal protection is inadequate;
— excessive hierarchization and centralization
undermine efficiency and effectiveness;
— local administrations or governmental agencies do
not have the authority or competencies to deal
with important issues;
— governments do not have a common set of rules
and procedures, making inter-institutional
cooperation slow and fitful;
— budgeting is not transparent, so that citizens do not
know what their taxes and fees are being spent on;
— careers in public administration depend on
political backing, not on personal capacity;
— bribes and other kinds of extralegal favours are
needed to get things done.
Again, this picture is not exclusive to Latin
America, nor does it reflect ongoing changes in the
region. In fact, some Latin American administrations
are considered world pioneers of administrative reform.
Brazil and Chile, for instance, offer examples of best
practice in a number of fields such as participatory
budgeting, customer orientation and the use of
information and communication technologies in
government. In the majority of cases, however, public
administrations still constitute a negative factor in
terms of competitiveness and governance. Why is this
so?
Public institutions need an internal organizational
structure in order to function properly. The
organizational structure which emanated from State-led
development is quite different from the one envisaged
by the good governance and systemic competitiveness
approaches. Rent seeking as a fundamental economic
behaviour and clientelism as a basic political pattern
engendered major lock-ins with respect to
administrative reform: since control of State institutions
meant access to rents, and political loyalty (even
legitimacy) accrued from material benefits distributed
through clientelist networks, public-sector staffing
became a crucial element of both welfare policy and
regime stabilization.
As a result, a typical feature of public administration
in Latin America is overstaffing combined with a
critical lack of human resources (since, sooner rather
than later, the most competent employees migrate to
the private sector) and an utterly inadequate
28 This paragraph draws on Altenburg (2003). See also Von
Haldenwang (2000, pp. 9-15).
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infrastructure. This is especially true at the regional and
local level, where career opportunities are even scarcer
and equipment even more obsolete. Also, institutional
memory is weak due to high turnover rates in the wake
of political changes. This leads to the seemingly
paradoxical situation of excessively rigid formal
routines combined with a high dependency on case-by-
case negotiations in everyday operations.29
Reforms at the micro-level should aim above all
at transforming the self-perception of public
administration, in favour of a stronger orientation
towards citizens and clients. So far, the opening of
markets and the changing role of the State vis-à-vis
society have modified the picture described only at a
snail’s pace. Indeed, the continuing provision of jobs
in the public sector has been used as a device to soften
the social impact of market liberalization and
privatization. Regional and local institutions have been
particularly keen to preserve this welfare function,
since reproduction of clientelist relations starts at the
local, eye-to-eye level and most of the costs of
unemployment have to be shouldered locally.
Modernization efforts in public administration
today are based on a set of normative premises that are
broadly accepted in both developing and industrialized
countries. These premises are often discussed under the
general heading of “new public management”  (NPM).30
Rather than a detailed model for administrative reform,
NPM refers to a set of instruments and normative
guidelines extracted from the experience of innovative
public administration, mostly in Anglo-Saxon and
Scandinavian countries. Key elements are:
— a shift from management by rule to management
by result, using the impact (outcome) of public
action on target groups as the main criterion for
administrative quality;
— the internal decentralization of competencies and
fiscal responsibility, in combination with the
introduction of private-sector accounting methods
and contract management;
— the mobilization of private capital for investment
by means of privatizations, public-private
partnerships (PPPs) and subcontracting;
— an emphasis on customer- and citizen-orientation,
including new methods of participation,
budgeting, demand assessment and personnel
management.
If political, economic and fiscal framework
conditions are tending in the direction of administrative
reform and at the same time the normative guidelines
of that reform seem to be widely accepted, why is it
that the dynamics of micro-level reform are still rather
low in Latin America? A main reason lies in the fact
that market-led development does not by itself generate
the public institutions needed for competitiveness. In
order to introduce and consolidate modern management
methods there have to be further changes in the
incentive structure.
For example, instead of NPM-oriented reform,
political leaders often prefer the “successful failure”  of
public institutions, namely a situation where the failure
to produce public goods and services is accompanied
by the successful alimentation of particular client
groups. Also, excessive centralization and overly rigid
hierarchies within public-sector bodies discourage
innovation from below. In such a setting, public-sector
employees will most likely try to prevent changes
unless they are invited to participate in the reform
process and compensated for the frustrations, setbacks
and additional efforts that usually come with
administrative change. Lastly, without visible
improvements in service delivery, public support for
reforms will be low.
As a consequence, reforms are most likely to
succeed if they: i) offer a prospect of political benefit
to reform leaders; ii) allow for innovations from below,
along with political leadership from above; iii) include
proper personnel management right from the start of
the process, and iv) are designed to produce at least
some highly visible short-term results, in order to
secure public support.
29 Apart from the organization and working of public administration,
there is also a micro-level dimension to political institutions in a
narrow sense of the term. For instance, the poor performance of
parliaments in Latin America can be traced back in part to the lack
of technical support for individual members and to the deficient
organization of parliamentary affairs. See Krumwiede and Nolte
(2000, pp. 90-109).
30 See Von Haldenwang (2000, pp. 25-30) and McCourt and
Minogue (2001) for a review of critical approaches to NPM. Koldo
Echebarría has called my attention to the fact that NPM is more than
just a micro-level approach. This is certainly true: NPM implies
fundamental changes in the relationship of public institutions with
citizens and enterprises. In this sense, there is a meta-level dimension
to micro-level reform.
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This paper has focused on common features of
systemic governance in the Latin American region. In
order to assess the reform propensity and orientation
of individual countries, additional case-by-case analysis
is needed. To give an example, the kind of systemic
governance and institutional lock-ins generated by a
country such as Ecuador with its strong dependency on
public rents from oil exports will be different from
those of, say, Honduras with its focus on maquila-type
assembly for export based on cheap, low-skilled labour.
However, to the extent that development is taking place
within the parameters of market economies, there is a
general need to strengthen the common interest
orientation of public institutions.
Systemic governance in this context implies that
the proper functioning of a political system, i.e., its
ability to formulate and implement policies in the
common interest, hinges upon political capacities at
different levels. These levels have been examined
separately, but in analytical terms they should be
regarded as an integrated whole. Hence, the question
arises as to which laws determine the interaction
between levels. For instance, if meta-level institutions
change, will there be predictable change patterns at the
meso-level? This paper does not provide a final answer
to that problem, but rather draws some tentative
conclusions on the basis of the findings presented
above.
Neither top-down nor bottom-up explanations of
political change are wholly satisfactory. Experts who
emphasize planning and vision as normative guidelines
for political action would probably incline towards a
model of change that started at the meta-level of
systemic governance and proceeded downward. There
is a point to this reasoning: development as goal-
oriented behaviour needs some kind of idea concerning
the status quo desired in the future. But then again,
there is no clear-cut relationship between visions and
reality. Political action often takes place under
conditions that do not follow strategic reasoning.
Pragmatism may at times be the only guiding principle
on hand.
On the other hand, there are experts who favour
a reform model that starts from modernization at the
meso- or even micro-level. Visible improvements in
one place are expected to stimulate reforms elsewhere,
thus generating a bottom-up process of change where
“ islands of modernity”  gradually emerge together. The
idea of “best practices”  that can be learnt from, the
widespread reliance on pilot projects as a means of
innovation and the increasing number of international
conferences where practitioners and social scientists
present their showcases to each other bear witness to
this approach, which we might term “ inductive” . Yet
there are major obstacles to this model of public-sector
modernization: unlike enterprises, which must learn in
order to survive in the market, public institutions may
very well prefer to avoid learning, for the reasons
outlined in the preceding section.
An alternative to the linear approaches touched
upon above would be to think in terms of cross-cutting
feedback circles. If societies leave traditional
development paths, parts of the pre-existing
institutional setting cease to be functional. Openly
dysfunctional institutions create legitimacy problems:
citizens begin to question the way things work, and
political forces begin to look for institutional
alternatives. This seems to be the case right now in
quite a number of Latin American countries, given the
poor record of the market-cum-democracy model in
terms of economic, social and political integration.
If political systems succeed in enhancing their
legitimacy through common interest orientation and
improved performance at any of the four levels, they
free up resources which can be employed for further
system consolidation. In principle, the higher the level
at which change takes place, the stronger the effect on
the system’s legitimacy. The direction and dynamics
of change, though, depend on the resources mobilized
by social groups to punish performance deficits or to
reward improvements.
This calls for an approach that does not focus
exclusively on the final objectives of reforms, but
keeps an eye on the processes leading to those
objectives. Such an approach would promote public-
sector capacity-building to enable States to act swiftly
and sustainably on legitimacy problems. Also, it would
strengthen representative decision-making and
implementation, since representative democracy has
proved to be the most suitable order for handling complex
public policy issues. Lastly, it would promote interest
articulation and mobilization by underprivileged groups
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so that the performance deficits affecting the neediest
could be put on the political agenda more effectively.
In contrast, an approach that pursues the
modernization of individual institutions will most likely
fail to produce sustainable improvements in
governance. Itemizing particular measures, even
creating a truly comprehensive list of necessary
reforms, will not obviate the logical fallacies outlined
in this paper.31  This is a major shortcoming of the good
governance concept as discussed so far: fine-tuning and
complementing the Washington consensus are a
necessary but not sufficient approach to development
and development cooperation.
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